In the later half of the twentieth century, Guatemala was embroiled in several conflicts. Between the revolution of 1944 and the Civil War that stretched from the sixties to the nineties, Guatemala saw much bloodshed. However, while these events are well studied, there is some lack of scholarship about the role of race. My goal for this project is to analyze how race was understood by the people involved in these hostilities, and how those understandings influenced their actions. I argue that a simplified understanding of race was used to justify involvement or tolerance of monstrous acts of violence.
For the conflict to be fully contextualized, it is important to be aware of the role of the United Fruit Company in Guatemala. For much of the early twentieth century, the UFC had nearly complete control of banana production and export in the country, dominating the economy. It was this monetary might that allowed the company to exert extreme influence over the Guatemalan government, paying officials great sums for favorable deals. In this system, ethnically white Guatemalan officials ensured that the company had lands as well as Ladino and Maya peasants to work them. At the height of their power, the UFC had even shipped Caribbean workers into Guatemala to harvest bananas. However, this system was disrupted in the revolution of 1944 when president Jorge Ubico was overthrown, and a new populist leader was elected. This scared the United Fruit Company, who feared that their unrivaled exploitation of the country could be challenged. This fear grew when president Jacobo Árbenz passed Decree 900, a land reform that seized undeveloped land from the UFC. Angered, the company began a campaign in the US to regain their holdings.
At the time, Truman was still president, and the expectation was that he would not intervene on the behalf of United Fruit. However, this did not stop some at the Central Intelligence Agency to begin drafting Operation PBSuccess.[1] Framed around a fear of communist ideology spreading to the Americas, the CIA began compiling names of notable individuals who were deemed a threat to the ideological threat to the country. Notable amongst the names compiled are officials from Árbenz’s government, often minority leaders.[2] PBSuccess quickly became a central focus of the CIA after the election of Eisenhower, who approved the operation. PBSuccess would be planed for the next two years, but it would face some setbacks. Nicholas Cullather notes how poorly the operation was planned, with serious lack of foresight, and several agents being discovered, some even captured in an early stage.[3] Eventually, the coup was launched, and Guatemala was thrown into chaos. As part of the plan Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan military official, invaded the Guatemalan countryside, tearing a violent path. Armas was intended to be a force of incredible destruction, before he was released the CIA had prepared a list of officials for his Junta to “dispose” of.[4] However, Armas’ invasion was a failure, and the capital was nearly untouched by his conquest. It was the threat of a war with the US that convinced the Guatemalan military to surrender and pressure Jacobo Árbenz to step down. Árbenz resigned as president, fleeing to Mexico.
PBSuccess was immediately met with open distain. The project was poorly planned and nearly failed, making it incredibly visible to the rest of the world. The coup marked a notable shift in Latin America, where the US was met with anger and ridicule.[5] On the world stage, the response was more muted, but still negative. European diplomats commented on the poor choices of the US, while US official Henry Cabot Lodge openly clashed with a representative of the Soviet Union, warning them to stay out of the situation.[6] However, despite the ramifications felt on the global stage, the CIA was able to pass PBSuccess off as a complete success within the US.[7] It was this successful disinformation campaign at home that lead directly into Operation PBHistory, an effort launched with the cooperation of the new Guatemalan government to comb through the documents of Árbenz and the Guatemalan Communist Party to find a connection between the two. PBHistory failed to link Árbenz to any kind of communist agenda.
Unfortunately, this was not the end of the violence in Guatemala. Many resisted the new regime, and the country was drawn into a long and bloody civil war. Under their new leadership, police departments across the nation began to detain those who were seen as against the state.[8] These were not simple arrests, as time went on more and more people were taken to be tortured and killed. As the conflict continued, the resistance forces drew out of the cities and into the countryside to form guerilla fighting groups. In response, new death squads were created act as the police had in the cities, detaining, torturing, and killing anyone suspected of resisting the state. Through all this the US kept a close eye on the situation. Between 1977 and 1986 the US Department of State compiled a secret report on the excessively high rate of killings and kidnappings. The investigation revealed that an overwhelming majority of the abductions were carried out by the Guatemalan government, and that most of the victims were young male Ladinos or Mayas living in the countyside.[9] In the midst of this, the Department of State advised the US to step back from the Guatemalan conflict. The aim of this decision less to force the Guatemalan regime to address the humanitarian concerns and more to gain leverage.[10] However, it was after the US took a step back that the war entered its deadliest phase.
Operation Sophia was launched in the summer of 1982. It was projected to be the final sweep that would end all insurgency in the Guatemalan countryside. In reality, it was an enormous systematic killing of indigenous peasants.[11] While the exact death count is unknown, tens of thousands of people are estimated to have died. Operation Sophia failed to end the civil war, and it failed to bring any kind of end to the violence. Well after Sophia, State sponsored death squads continued to terrorize the Ladinos and Maya of the countryside, steadily wiping out entire communities.[12]
Through out the twentieth century, race defined the developments of Guatemala. Recently reshaped by the United Fruit Company, race was a critical lens for the Central Intelligence Agency to frame the terms of the conflict. Renewed after attempts at social reform within the country, a far right regime used race as a label for enemies of the state. Living within these racial categories, young men found themselves forced to flee to fight for their lives or be abducted by a government hostile towards them. Race not only defined how many saw the conflict, but how the conflict itself came to be fought.
[1] “CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954”, CIA History Staff Analysis by Gerald K. Haines, June 1995.
[2] “CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954”, CIA History Staff Analysis by Gerald K. Haines, June 1995.
[3] “Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952- 1954”, CIA History Staff document by Nicholas Cullather, 1994. Excerpt.
[4] “Selection of individuals for disposal by Junta Group”, CIA, March 31, 1954.
[5] “Gloriosa Victoria” (Glorious Victory) – Diego Rivera. Oil on linen. 1954. Collection of the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts in Moscow, Russia.
[6] National Archives – U.S. Warns Russia to Keep Hands off in Guatemala Crisis – National Security Council. Central Intelligence Agency.
[7] “Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952- 1954”, CIA History Staff document by Nicholas Cullather, 1994. Excerpt.
[8] “ARCHIVOS DEPARTAMENTAL SACATEPEQUEZ, Document 3056097”, Digital Archive of the Guatemalan National Police Historical Archive, 1960-01-01.
[9] “Guatemala’s Disappeared 1977-86”, Department of State, secret report, March 28, 1986.
[10] “Guatemala: What Next?”, Department of State, secret memorandum, October 5, 1981.
[11] “Operation Sofia: Documenting Genocide in Guatemala”, National Security Archive, December 2, 2009.
[12] “Guatemalan Death Squad Dossier”, National Security Archive, May 20, 1999.
Sources:
“CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954”, CIA History Staff Analysis by Gerald K. Haines, June 1995. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/
“Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952- 1954”, CIA History Staff document by Nicholas Cullather, 1994. Excerpt. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/
“Selection of individuals for disposal by Junta Group”, CIA, March 31, 1954. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/
“Gloriosa Victoria” (Glorious Victory) – Diego Rivera. Oil on linen. 1954. Collection of the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts in Moscow, Russia.
National Archives – U.S. Warns Russia to Keep Hands off in Guatemala Crisis – National Security Council. Central Intelligence Agency. (09/18/1947 – 12/04/1981). ARC 1692910 / LI 263.1381
“ARCHIVOS DEPARTAMENTAL SACATEPEQUEZ, Document 3056097”, Digital Archive of the Guatemalan National Police Historical Archive, 1960-01-01. https://ahpn.lib.utexas.edu/
“Guatemala’s Disappeared 1977-86”, Department of State, secret report, March 28, 1986. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB32/vol2.html
“Guatemala: What Next?”, Department of State, secret memorandum, October 5, 1981. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB32/vol2.html
“Operation Sofia: Documenting Genocide in Guatemala”, National Security Archive, December 2, 2009. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB297/index.htm
“Guatemalan Death Squad Dossier”, National Security Archive, May 20, 1999. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB15/